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Territorial Policy Communities and Devolution in the United 
Kingdom 
 
Michael Keating, European University Institute and University of Aberdeen 
Paul Cairney, University of Aberdeen 
Eve Hepburn, University of Edinburgh 
 
Abstract 
Devolution in the United Kingdom forms part of a wider process of spatial re-scaling across 
Europe. Little work has been done on its effect on interest articulation. The literature on policy 
communities treats them as sectoral in scope. We propose the concept of ‘territorial policy 
communities’ to designate territorially-bounded constellations of actors within and across policy 
sectors, emerging in response to the rescaling of government. Devolution may leave existing 
systems of interest articulation unchanged, leaving ‘regions without regionalism’; it may confine 
some groups within territorial boundaries while allowing others freedom to choose between 
levels of government; or it might promote a general territorialization of interest representation 
and the emergence of territorial policy communities. The UK’s four models of devolution help 
test the effects of stronger and weaker forms of devolution on the territorialization of groups.  
 
 
Spatial rescaling and devolution 
Modernization theory has long suggested that territory would give way to function as the basis 
for the division of labour, social differentiation and interest representation. For sociologists, the 
reasons were functional and linked to the emergence of industrial society. Durkheim (1964) and 
Deutsch (1966) argued that social evolution broke down territorial barriers to create integrated 
national societies, providing the basis for political order. Political scientists came to similar 
conclusions, albeit for more institutionalist reasons and privileging the state as the agent of 
assimilation. Stein Rokkan (Flora et al., 1999) demonstrated how states emerged through a 
process of boundary construction, enclosing political, social and economic systems and limiting 
the possibilities for individuals or groups to operate beyond national space. Unable to exit the 
national polity, representatives of social and political interests were forced to turn inwards, 
suppressing internal territorial differences and operating across national space. This fostered 
interaction, leading to national political bargaining and social compromises. Political science has 
since assumed that interest representation in European countries is state-wide. It assumes that 
sectoral and class interests take the same form everywhere, so that regional differences in the 
patterns of politics reflect the differential presence of sectoral or class interests within territories, 
rather than relating to territory itself. Social compromises, notably between capital and labour 
(mediated by the state) are struck at the national level. Social concertation or corporatism is a 
state-level phenomenon, depending on the existence of a state boundary preventing defection. 
The Keynesian welfare state was a form of positive-sum compromise depending on the existence 
of this boundary and a sense of shared identity and social solidarity.  
 
This vision of interest intermediation has been challenged in recent debates on globalization, 
European integration, spatial rescaling, new regionalism and devolution. The functionalist 
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argument about national integration and boundaries is questioned by the rescaling of capitalist 
production at multiple levels, above, below and across states (Brenner, 2004; Brenner et al., 
2003; McLeod, 2001). New regionalism posits the rise of territorial production systems at 
various scales (Scott, 1998; Storper, 1997; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Crouch et al., 2001). 
Institutionalist analysis has similarly drawn attention to shifting scales of government, at the 
European, transnational and sub-state levels (Balme, 1996; Keating, 1998). Bartolini (2005) has 
discerned a partial reversal of the Rokkanian process of coincident boundary-building, as 
different policy systems assume different territorial boundaries, at the sub-state or supranational 
levels.  
 
There is little empirical work on the effects of spatial rescaling on interest articulation and 
representation. The new regionalism literature does not clearly identify institutions or patterns of 
political exchange. Some versions highlight the prospects for new positive-sum social 
compromises. Cooke and Morgan (1998) argue that, at the appropriate level, new forms of social 
partnership may enhance productive efficiency and secure social integration, though Lovering 
(1999) criticizes this as wishful thinking. Another literature largely ignores institutions and 
interests, instead emphasising how the culture and ‘social capital’ of territorial societies 
determines their capacity for collective action. Putnam (1993) makes little effort to establish the 
link between social attitudes and policy outcomes and merely asserts that ‘social capital’ can 
enhance both economic output and democratic performance, with nothing on the role of capital 
and labour or social conflict.  ‘Multilevel governance’ approaches, though addressing rescaled 
systems of policy-making, conceptualize actors as individuals or organizations, not 
representatives of social interests (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Bache and Flinders, 2004). Levels 
refers to organizational boundaries and there is no concept of territory as found in social 
geography or the new regionalism.  
 
Bartolini (2005), from an institutionalist perspective, addresses the issue of social compromises 
and interaction, arguing that the selective opening of boundaries of policy systems allows certain 
groups a ‘partial exit’, enabling them to opt out of exchange, compromise and solidarity. This 
recalls earlier arguments in urban political economy that emphasize the mobility of capital, 
which gives it a privileged place in city politics compared with territorially-rooted groups 
(Peterson, 1985; Kantor, 1995;  Keating, 1991). The regulation of different policy fields at 
different levels challenges the old social compromises of the state. The privileged and mobile, 
including owners of capital, may be able to delink themselves from co-citizens, either by moving 
physically or ‘venue-shopping’ (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991). This contrasts with the new 
regionalism, which sees the possibilities for a new, positive-sum, compromise at the regional 
level.  
 
Devolution can be seen as a response to these processes of restructuring, though European states 
have had different motivations for doing so. There is the need for administrative modernization 
and public services rationing. New models of regional development, promoted by academics and 
the European Commission, emphasize the advantages of decentralized delivery. There are 
bottom-up pressures from regions and stateless nations engaged in new forms of polity-building, 
leading to the emergence of a regional or meso level of government (Sharpe, 1993). This creates 
new spaces for interest articulation and representation. Compared with nation-states, however, 
regions are weakly-bounded communities. Devolution may be aimed at capturing the re-scaled 
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systems of economic and social change, but these are inherently open. It is relatively easy for 
some groups to opt-out of social compromise and operate at new levels but this is variable and 
depends on the design of the institutions. In some cases, regional devolution takes a functionally-
based form consisting of economic development agencies. In others, it is more political with 
wider competences, and draws in a broader range of actors. In some instances, there is no interest 
group activity at all. Pastori (1971) and Trigilia (1991), writing about the Italian regional 
governments established in the 1970s, spoke of ‘regions without regionalism’ and ‘the paradox 
of the regions’, meaning that regional government had not been matched by regional civil 
societies or interest groups.  
 
Territorial Policy Communities 
The public policy literature has spawned a plethora of concepts to analyse patterns of interest 
articulation, interaction and competition within policy systems. Some merely map the field. 
Ostrom (1999) uses the term ‘action areas’ to trace the participants, positions, outcomes, action-
outcome linkages, information and costs. A related concept is the ‘policy network’, involving 
government officials, politicians, experts or lobbyists in a policy domain. Beyond this are 
approaches that theorize the relationships among actors. The ‘policy community’ suggests a 
degree of consensus and coherence among actors (Richardson and Jordan, 1979; Rhodes, 1981; 
Wright and Wilks, 1987; Rhodes and Marsh, 1992; Marsh and Smith, 2000). A related French 
concept is the référentiel (Jobert and Muller, 1987) – a common set of assumptions, frame of 
reference and appreciation of issues. The ‘advocacy coalition’ is a constellation of actors within 
a policy domain sharing values and interests and perceptions of problems and solutions (Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). The debate has been prey to semantic arguments in which the 
definition of terms has become more important than the substantive questions (Dowding, 1995, 
2001; Marsh and Smith, 2000). Yet we can discern two issues. The first is structural – the 
delineation of the policy sub-system and identification of actors and their relationships. The 
second is behavioural – actor strategy, the degree of cohesiveness or consensus and shared norms 
among actors. We propose to use the term ‘policy community’ to refer to the first, and treat the 
questions raised in the second as variables. 
 
Policy communities are normally presented as sectoral, although some have hinted that they may 
be territorial or trans-territorial (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith,1999).  
Our aim is to examine the impact of spatial rescaling and we propose the concept ‘territorial 
policy community’. This may be a territorially-confined sectoral community; or it may be a 
cross-sectoral policy community organized around territorial interests. There is no inherent 
contradiction between territory and sector as a basis for interest articulation; becoming more 
territorial does not imply a diminution of sectoral identification. Rather, these dimensions are 
combined in different ways over time. We pose two questions. The first is whether territorial 
policy communities have emerged. The second relates to their characteristics, including their 
degree of cohesiveness, shared norms, shared conceptions of territory, and interactions at the 
territorial level.  
 
Broadly speaking, there are three possible consequences of devolution. One is no change 
(‘regions without regionalism’) as traditional functional divisions bounded by the nation-state 
predominate. A second is a partial exit, as selected groups delink themselves from others and 
venue-shop for favourable treatment. A third is ‘new regionalism’, in which new policy 
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communities emerge at the new spatial level. To assess this, we examined a number of 
dimensions of change among interest groups: 
  
Organizational change. The extent to which groups change their structures to deal with new 
levels of government.  
Focus. The main orientation of groups and where they see their main interlocutors. 
Cognitive frames. This is more subtle and less easily operationalized, but broadly refers to the 
perspective from which a group regards policy issues (sub-state, state, supra-national or local), 
the expression of a territorial identity, and the existence of shared norms, values and interests.  
Interaction. The extent to which groups interact with each other at the same territorial level 
within and across policy domains,  
Lobbying. This is a more traditional mode of territorial politics in which groups come together in 
defence of a shared territorial interest 
 
Our hypotheses are as follows: 
1. The stronger the form of government devolution, then (a) the more devolution interest 
groups will introduce in their own structures; and (b) the stronger the new boundary; 
more groups will be locked in, closing off possibilities of partial exit and venue-
shopping. 
2. This will lead to a cognitive change, in which issues are defined within a new territorial 
perspective, and territorial political communities gain legitimacy. 
3. This will produce more group interaction and a widening of the regional policy agenda. 
4. At the limit one might find forms of social concertation or meso-level corporatism 
(although, given the times and the weakness of the institutions, this would not be 
pronounced). 
5. Yet, groups that have previously been able to co-operate in territorial lobbies will now 
become competitors in the new policy arena, causing strains and difficulties in 
adaptation.  
6. The emerging communities will be marked by historic legacies; groups opposed to 
devolution will be slower to respond. 
 
Cases and Method 
In the UK we have four distinct models of devolution and, prima facie, quite different forms of 
territorialized interest politics. This allows us to make a controlled comparison within a single 
state. In Scotland, there is a Parliament with legislative competences over all matters not 
expressly reserved, a Government (formerly Executive) and a substantial civil service. In Wales, 
there has been only administrative devolution over specified areas of policy, although this has 
changed since the Government of Wales Act, 2006. In North East England, there has been a 
weaker form of functional devolution, with a Regional Development Agency and indirectly-
elected Regional Assembly, with rather limited competences around economic development and 
planning. Northern Ireland (NI), which has had a prolonged period of direct rule from 
Westminster, has a potentially stronger system than Wales. But it has been slow in developing 
and the territorial dimension of policy-making is hampered by community division.  
 
We have conducted some 300 interviews with interest group representatives since 1999. The 
most complete information is available for Scotland, where interviews were conducted in 1999-
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2000, 2003-4 and 2006. This does not include interviews conducted in the early 1980s, which 
provided background for the pre-devolution years (Keating and Midwinter, 1983). Interviews 
were conducted in the Northern region of England between 2000 and 2003, Wales in 2005 and 
Northern Ireland in 2006-8. This does not give us a perfect before-and-after set of interviews for 
each case. Interviews in Northern Ireland coincided with moves back to devolution on the basis 
of power-sharing institutions, but instability made it difficult to get useful information before 
2006. In Northern England, the process was halted by the failure of the devolution referendum in 
2004.  
 
We can divide groups into: purely territorial; territorial groups affiliated to UK/British groups; 
territorial branches of UK/British groups; and purely British/UK groups. The sectors covered 
are: business; trade unions; education; health; other professions; and the voluntary sector. 
Examining business and trade unions enabled us to assess the extent of adaptation of economic 
representation and patterns of traditional class politics. The voluntary sector is included to assess 
the degree of openness of the new policy systems to non-producer interests, promised in the 
name of ‘new politics’ (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 11). The professions are important actors, 
since public services are among the most important tasks of devolved government and there is 
strong evidence of different models of delivery since devolution (Keating, 2005; Greer, 2004). In 
each case, we examined the pre-devolution networks and organizational change; the focus of 
activity; cognitive frames; and interactions. Organizational change was assessed by asking group 
representatives about their relationships with the various levels of government, municipal, 
devolved, UK and European. Focus of activity was determined by asking groups about which 
levels of government they were most engaged with. We assessed cognitive change by posing 
questions about policy issues and seeing whether respondents answered using a purely sectoral 
or a territorial frame of reference. Interactions were measured by asking group representatives 
about their relations with other groups and triangulating the responses by those of the other 
groups concerned.  
 
Scotland 
Organizational change 
Before devolution, Scotland had its own interest groups, mostly independent or branches of UK 
groups (Kellas, 1989). During the twentieth century business and unions consolidated at the UK 
level, but the growing competences of the Scottish Office produced a need for a Scottish 
presence from mid-century. Education and agriculture had independent Scottish groups as did 
most of the voluntary sector. The medical professions were organized on a UK basis, although 
two of the Royal Colleges are located in Scotland. While there was consensus on a shared 
Scottish lobby across sectoral, class and party divisions, political devolution was long a divisive 
issue. Big business feared left-wing dominance and threats to the UK single market, but by the 
mid-1990s, had retreated to sceptical neutrality (Lynch, 1998). Since the late 1960s trade unions 
tended to devolution, but with guarantees for the unified British welfare state, labour market and 
economic management (Keating and Bleiman, 1979). The voluntary sector and new social 
movements saw a Scottish Parliament as a means of increasing their access to government. Few 
new groups emerged in response to devolution but activity has been rationalized, with a clearer 
distinction between UK and Scottish matters and some enhanced policy capacity at the Scottish 
level. Groups generally have autonomy in policy matters devolved to Scotland.  
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Focus 
Big business remains largely UK-focused, and can by-pass Scottish levels of government on 
issues of macro-economic policy and regulation. Yet it is interested in devolved matters such as 
infrastructure, education and training. In the early days of devolution, big business was distant 
from the new institutions but, as the Scottish Government emphasized economic growth, was 
drawn into the policy networks.  This presented a challenge to a rather fragmented system of 
representation (Raco, 2003). By 2007 the big business lobby had firm links with the Scottish 
Government and these were not affected by the change of party government that year. Small 
business, more dependent on public goods provided at the Scottish level, was more enthusiastic 
from the start.  
 
Agriculture is cross-pressured since the field is almost completely devolved, yet subject to 
European policy which is negotiated through the UK government. Devolution has reduced 
Scottish farmers’ contacts with the UK department and they work closely through the Scottish 
Government. They also operate in Brussels, sharing an office with English farmers. Large 
estates, like big business, are increasingly owned by multinationals. The Scottish Rural Property 
and Business Association has abandoned its old protectionism and become more active at the 
Scottish level. 
 
Trade unions have historically had a local and UK orientation. They are mostly organized on a 
UK basis but affiliated to the separate Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC). Labour 
regulation is a largely reserved matter and there is a tendency now to leave this to the UK-level 
of unions. But training policy and responsibility for local development are devolved, so the 
unions are drawn into the Scottish networks. They are also concerned with social issues and 
public sector employment, giving them a stronger orientation than employers to the Scottish 
networks.  
 
The medical professions have become an important part of the Scottish policy community. While 
the British Medical Association (BMA) operates across the UK, the Royal College of Surgeons 
of England does not. Rather, the Colleges in Scotland contribute to reserved medical training and 
standards issues. Primary and secondary education in Scotland has always been distinct, with its 
own networks. Higher education is almost entirely devolved and policy has begun to diverge, but 
the Research Assessment Exercise remains UK-wide (Keating, 2005b). Consequently, 
universities need to access the Scottish policy networks while staying UK-focussed for fear of 
isolation. Professional organizations in social work, housing and town planning are organized on 
a UK-wide basis but devolution has forced Scottish divisions to acquire more policy capacity. 
 
The voluntary sector consists largely of Scottish groups or autonomous branches of UK bodies. 
The Scottish Council of Voluntary Organizations (SCVO) found in 1997 that its members were 
overwhelming pro-devolution, seeing it as an opportunity to break the hold of political parties, 
local government and the civil service (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008). A Scottish Compact with 
the voluntary sector was signed by the Labour Government before devolution and renewed in 
2004, though a certain disillusion has since set in due to Scottish Government inattention 
(Maxwell, 2007). Local government remains a rival in the control of services and resources and 
strongly insists on its representative credentials. Trade unions, while supportive of volunteering 
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in principle, are wary that it might be used to substitute for full-time jobs and are strongly 
attached to traditional modes of service delivery.  
 
European issues and networks appeared less salient than expected. Groups tended to leave 
European matters to their UK counterparts or to pan-European groups, although Scotland Europa 
in Brussels is used to pursue specifically Scottish issues. There is a general acceptance of 
European integration as beneficial to Scotland, although opinions on the single currency are 
divided along similar lines to England and Wales.  
 
Cognitive frames and shared values 
Scottish identity is so widely shared within Scotland (McCrone, 2001) that it does not provide a 
discriminating factor among groups. The meaning and implications, however, are contested. At 
one time identity could be confined to the cultural realm, without clear implications for politics 
or socio-economic representation. This has become more difficult since the 1960s and especially 
since devolution. Institutional change has strengthened an existing Scottish frame of reference. 
There is a shared emotive commitment to the idea of Scotland and the promotion of Scottish 
interests. There is a concern to establish the legitimacy of Scottish groups, reflected in support 
for symbolic matters like Scottish bank notes. No respondent questioned the legitimacy of the 
Scottish Parliament, yet groups are reluctant to confine themselves to the Scottish arena, fearing 
marginalization from the big UK issues.  
 
Scottish attitudes are fairly close to the UK average, despite the Scottish egalitarian myth of a 
stronger commitment to the welfare state, collectivism and equality (Rosie and Bond, 2007). 
Further, the dominant stereotypes can be given very different policy implications and there is 
also a right-wing Scottish story in which egalitarianism is the basis for meritocracy and anti-
socialism (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001). Respondents were prone to cite these stereotypes and the 
shared Scottish perspective meant that all groups have to pay attention to issues of social 
inclusion as well as economic competition (although we have not found evidence of a distinct 
Scottish capitalism). A similar story can be told about Europe. Scottish electors are slightly less 
Euro-sceptic than English ones (McCrone, 2006) but there is a strong elite consensus in favour of 
Europe. This is tied to the territorial frame of reference, the perception of Scotland as a 
‘European region’ and an object of European policy. 
 
Interaction 
There is some lock-in as groups must address each others’ concerns and cannot opt out of 
Scottish politics as easily as in the past. So business groups will accept the legitimacy of the 
Scottish Government’s social inclusion strategy, while unions and social interest groups will 
accept the need for economic competitiveness. There is less evidence of old class conflicts than 
we found in North East England.  
 
There is a distinct Scottish policy-making style involving consultation and working through 
professional networks and the usual story of everybody knowing everybody else. The Scottish 
Government is descended directly from the Scottish Office, which had little policy-making 
capacity since its main task was to implement Whitehall policies. The Government relies on 
policy-making networks and professional groups more than the UK government. It has also been 
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committed to consultation and this has encouraged groups to strengthen their Scottish level of 
organization. 
 
On the other hand, devolution has politicized the policy process, introduced new actors, and 
forced actors to face conflicts of interest and competition for resources, displacing conflict to the 
outside. Scottish politics before 1999 revolved around lobbying the centre. Groups combined to 
promote a shared Scottish interest on matters like public spending or industrial closures. Now 
they compete and must come up with their own policy ideas. As a consequence of the move from 
the politics of managed dependency to autonomy, the village story about consensualism will no 
longer serve its purpose. Overall, while no group or sector can completely opt out of the Scottish 
policy community, different groups are oriented differently and opportunities for partial exit 
exist, especially in the business community. There is evidence of more inter-sectoral and cross-
class dialogue and consultation than in the past. So there has been a rebuilding of policy 
communities in Scotland after devolution, but it has been limited. 
 
Wales 
Organizational change 
Before devolution, Wales had few independent interest groups or strong arms of UK groups. 
This resulted from the greater administrative integration of Wales with England, the lack of pre-
union organisations, the weaker development of the Welsh Office and the cross-border flows of 
people and services. Opinions on devolution were divided, with business moving from hostility 
to passive resistance and unions and the voluntary sector being more favourable. The issue was 
not debated extensively in Wales as it was in Scotland and there was little preparation before 
1999. 
 
Since devolution, business groups have modestly strengthened their Welsh branches. The Wales 
Trades Union Congress (WTUC) has gained one staff member but remains a branch of the 
British TUC and not all unions have an all-Wales level (Pike et al., 2006). The voluntary sector 
has responded more strongly, forming umbrella groups such as Learning Disability Wales (from 
local bodies) to complement the Wales Council for Voluntary Action (WCVO). Professional 
bodies tend to be UK-based. There is no major separate teaching union, and the Association of 
University Teachers did not have a presence in Wales until it merged with the National 
Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education (NATFHE) to form the University and 
College Union (UCU). Wales never had royal colleges of medicine, although the Welsh 
Assembly Government (WAG) encouraged the development of an Academy of Medical Royal 
Colleges in Wales to provide a Welsh focus and policy advice. Although the Royal College of 
Nursing has a federal structure, it struggled to adapt to devolution. The British Medical 
Association (BMA) was also slow to develop capacity. Overall, Welsh interest groups remain 
under-resourced and dependent on London-based bodies for policy advice.  
 
Focus 
Welsh business interests focus mainly on the UK and tend to oppose policy divergence. The lack 
of legislative devolution means that much policy-making remains in Whitehall. Groups insist on 
a unified UK market and business regulation, although territorial lobbying invites mild 
protectionism and more local government procurement. Business was rather disengaged during 
the first term but galvanized by opposition to the proposal to incorporate the Welsh Development 
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Agency in the Welsh Assembly Government. The main constraint on Welsh involvement 
remains lack of capacity.  
 
Agriculture is locally owned and operated. The National Farmers Union has a Welsh office 
which focuses on the Welsh Assembly Government (WAG), reflecting different conditions (a 
greater reliance on livestock) and an incremental devolution of powers to Wales since 1999. 
However, the Europeanization of policy often produces a common UK interest. The National 
Farmers’ Union (NFU) in Wales maintains few direct links to Whitehall.  Rather, it lobbies 
through the WAG and NFU in England. There is also a separate farming union – the Farming 
Union of Wales – which supported devolution and supports greater powers for the National 
Assembly for Wales. 
 
Trade unions support devolution but also UK-wide pay bargaining and regulation. Welsh 
branches of unions and Wales Trade Union Congress (WTUC) have little direct contact with 
Whitehall; they feed into UK policy through the TUC and National Assembly. Welsh trade 
unionists have close relationships with Labour Ministers in the Welsh Assembly Government, 
and there is a Memorandum of Understanding based on the Scottish Concordat (Pike et al., 
2006).  
 
The health professions are part of a distinct policy community drawing on local authorities to 
maintain a broad public health agenda.  However, a cross-border flow of patients and staff keeps 
England comparisons high on the agenda. The main focus of teaching unions is the significantly 
diverging policy agenda, although teacher pay is still negotiated UK-wide. The National Union 
of Teachers supports Welsh policy and devolution gave it the opportunity to influence policy that 
it lost in Whitehall.     
 
Higher Education Wales (HEW) forms part of Universities UK. However, HEW also has 
extensive links with the Welsh Assembly Government (and Higher Education and Funding 
Council Wales—HEFCW) which maintains its own policy community and has a reasonably 
distinct agenda. HEW tends to oppose policy differences which have a disproportionate effect on 
Welsh institutions (as with top-up fees) and to discourage inward looking policies.  
 
Cognitive frames and shared values 
Welsh national identity is less salient than Scottish (Jeffery, 2005), and more divided, between 
North and South and between English and Welsh speakers. While previously divisive, language 
has now been incorporated into a civic Welsh identity, with the Welsh Language Act of 1993 
and further steps after devolution to mainstream the language. Elites follow this agenda, but there 
is a strong feeling among unions and business that the mainstreaming efforts should not enter the 
private sector. As in Scotland, institutional change has strengthened the territorial frame. There is 
a shared commitment to the promotion of Welsh interests and a strong pressure felt within 
groups to ‘be Welsh’. 
 
Despite communitarian myths and a social democratic approach, summed up in First Minister 
Rhodri Morgan’s ‘clear red water’ speech, the ‘story’ about Wales cannot simply be read off 
public opinion. Welsh attitudes do not appear to be as left-wing as their Scottish and English 
counterparts and they are less egalitarian (Jones and Scully, 2004). There is a more pragmatic 
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source for this different frame of reference, based on different policy conditions such as 
geographyi. Wales has a population of three million with no large cities, no conurbation and 
limited connections to roads and public transport. This limits English models based on provider 
choice. Instead, the focus is co-ordination and sharing.  
 
Interaction 
The combination of open access to decision-makers and the low capacity of groups suggests that 
the barriers to inclusion within policy communities are minimal. There is little evidence of old 
class conflicts and a tangible sense of pragmatism in working arrangements. Business 
organisations and the Welsh Trade Union Congress (WTUC) formed the Social Partners Unit to 
foster joint working and joint responses through the Business Partnership Council and the 
WTUC is represented on the Welsh Council of Voluntary Action’s board.  
 
Groups identify a ‘Welsh Way’ of consultation and ‘partnership working’ (Cairney, 2008). This 
derives from a combination of Wales’ small size, a Welsh Assembly Government (WAG) desire 
to foster a sense of collective working, and a low policy capacity. The effect is an approach 
based on ‘everyone round the table’, which fosters more lock-in based on personal relationships.  
In the early years of devolution, this involved a regularity of interaction among groups from 
different sectors to a degree not witnessed in Scotland. Yet these relationships could be described 
as ‘wide but not deep’. First, the partnership council meetings are often described by participants 
as ‘talking shops’ and there is low cross-sectoral interaction outwith these set piece events. 
Second, personal relationships are often developed with ministers rather than civil servants. 
Therefore, partnerships may be apparent in the principle but not the details of policy (and in 
some cases the principles are non-negotiable). This is an important qualification given the broad 
suspicion of most groups towards the perceived cosy relations between WAG and the Welsh 
Local Government Association.  
 
The consultation style also exposes differences which may have been masked by bilateral 
negotiations, i.e., the Higher Education Funding Council for Wales (HEFCW) can conduct useful 
meetings across the university sector while the Higher Education Funding Council for England 
(HEFCE) cannot. Yet, given the agenda on rationalisation which accompanies funding decisions 
each university has an acute sense of winning or losing within these meetings.  These tensions 
are magnified when groups are brought together, with businesses and colleges left feeling 
second-best to local authorities in their relations with ministers (Cairney, 2008). 
 
A combination of cognitive frames and interaction can be summed-up by the phrase ‘made in 
Wales’. This provides a strong driver for interaction related to ‘policy ownership’ (McEwen, 
2005) and the sense of a close-knit Welsh ‘family’ (suggesting shared norms), based on the 
positive attitude of the WAG to interest groups. Yet, this is undermined by the uneven balance of 
power between groups. Groups have found the transition from lobbyists to competing policy 
influentials difficult.  
 
North East England 
Organizational change 
The North East of England has some territorial identity, including a distinct dialect, a labour-
dominated political culture, a certain anti-southern sentiment, and some sense of shared history 
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(Tomaney, 1999, 2000a, b). However, it has largely been created through public policy since the 
1930s and as a standard region since the 1960s. There have not been separate interest groups but 
business, unions and social interest groups have established regional presences in response to 
economic decline and successive government plans for the region and there was some 
collaboration in the pursuit of inward investment.  
 
After 1997 the regional development agency, One North East, was built on existing agencies. A 
Regional Assembly drew on local government representatives and nominees of business, labour 
and social organizations, with the task of deliberating regional strategies and priorities. However, 
English Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) were to be business-led and not responsible to 
the assemblies. A Government Office for the region existed since the 1990s to co-ordinate 
central government regeneration policies. A loosely Labour-led movement for elected regional 
government was taken forward on a cross-party basis by a Constitutional Convention (Tomaney, 
2000a, b), and a referendum was held in 2004. The failure of the referendum leaves a range of 
independent agencies without any central forum or authoritative decision-maker.  
 
The establishment of the RDA and Regional Assembly has led to some organizational change, 
especially among groups concerned with economic development. The Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI) has strengthened its regional level, and a North East Chamber of Commerce was 
established in Durham. A Northern Business Forum aims to bring business interests together, 
although there is internal tension and the small business sector has not always been welcome 
(Dixon, 2006). The Trades Union Congress (TUC) has modestly strengthened its regional 
organization. Some voluntary groups have also set up regional machinery, although this is less 
extensive. On the other hand, the Government Office for the region lost some powers and 
remains separate from the development agency (Mawson and Hall, 2000).   
 
Focus 
In the absence of significant regional government, groups still operate within UK or English 
sectoral policy frameworks. Business groups take their lead from London, and focus their 
lobbying on central government as do trade unions. Voluntary organizations are often tied into 
local government programmes or operate at the local level. New networks have formed around 
issues of development but have not taken on a life of their own and are not binding, so partners 
can exit at any time. Participation is guided largely by instrumental considerations rather than 
territorial loyalty, reflected in the divisions of the nominated Regional Assembly. Business 
organizations are sceptical, seeing it as little more than a talking shop, or a way of hamstringing 
the Regional Development Agency. Regionalists from the unions and academia were more 
supportive, but were concerned with the presence and localist orientation of old Labour 
politicians. Representatives of the voluntary sector and social groups supported the Assembly, 
since it gave them a forum for the first time, but were frustrated at the lack of powers. These 
attitudes spilled over into the debate about regional government. Business opposed political 
devolution, preferring the existing functionally specific model, in which they have a guaranteed 
independent role. They fear that a regional government would be dominated by the left, whether 
old Labour politicians or new regionalists committed to social inclusion and sustainable 
development.  
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Institutional change has thus strengthened the North East as a framework for interest articulation, 
but this is stronger in some sectors than in others. The Regional Assembly provides an outlet for 
voices that previously were not heard and encourages them to operate at the regional level, but 
this representation is separated from the hard decisions made in the Regional Development 
Agency. The weakness of the regional level means that strong groups can choose whether to use 
it. With this exit option, they are not forced into a social dialogue or into policy compromises.  
 
Cognitive frames 
Organizational change has strengthened the North East region as a frame of reference, although 
groups use different boundaries and some do not see the region as salient. The Regional 
Development Agency (RDA) is focused on economic development and planning, so the region 
features mainly as a framework for development policy and infrastructure planning. There is 
wide agreement that effective development needs a regional approach, with co-ordinated efforts 
in infrastructure provision, business promotion and training. The RDA has become an accepted 
part of the institutional landscape and all groups wanted to keep it. Groups also shared a concern 
with manufacturing industry and its neglect by governments dependent on votes in the south, as 
well as a marked resentment of Scottish advantages in public spending. Menu (2008) found 
economic actors, in business and the development agency, stressing the importance of territorial 
loyalty, the virtues of the workforce and the need to valorize the industrial tradition of the region. 
They also emphasized the small size of the region and the ease of communication as well as 
competition with Scotland. Yet there are sharp divisions within the region and a national 
framework prevails. Territorial identity is weak and there is no broader conception of common 
political space, no shared narratives of the region. Nor did we find a strong European dimension 
in the vision of regional actors, except in relation to Structural Fund resources.  
 
Interaction 
There is a strong sense of regional economic interest and of an economic development 
community. Business and trade unions share much of the same productivist orientation, stressing 
investment and jobs. This does not, however, produce a shared societal or political project for the 
region. It can bring them into conflict with environmental groups and voluntary groups who 
stress issues of sustainable development, social justice and redistribution. Within the dominant 
political party, Labour, there is a strong localism, a focus on the politics of distribution and 
clientelism and a suspicion of regionalism. Some of the trade unions, notably Unison, have a 
broader vision, encompassing both economic and social issues and this, together with the 
voluntary sector and some academics, provided the basis for the regional government movement. 
Yet the failure of the move beyond functional regionalism ensured that groups are not locked 
into a common regional political system.  
 
Northern Ireland 
Organizational change 
Despite the experience of the Stormont regime (1921-72) Northern Irish interest groups were 
more strongly integrated with those in England than their Scotland counterparts. Some, however, 
were divided on sectarian lines while others were divided between UK and all-Ireland bodies; 
this is the case notably with trade unions. Education is divided into several sectors – primarily 
the state-controlled (Protestant) school sector and the Catholic-maintained sector which both 
have employing authorities, in addition to integrated schooling and the Irish language schools. 
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There are five teaching unions representing different sectors. The business community is 
represented as a whole but agriculture is divided on sectarian lines.  
 
Under direct rule, groups needed a strong presence in London to lobby ministers and MPs. This 
encouraged organisational centralization, and ensured that local presence on the ground was 
minimal. London-based staff produced campaign literature and responded to consultations in 
Belfast, eased by Northern Irish replication of English policy models.  
 
Devolution has required branches of UK-wide organisations to reorient their activities. The 
business sector has diverted resources to Northern Ireland (NI).  The Federation of Small 
Businesses established a new Policy Unit in Belfast. Agricultural bodies, divided along structural 
and religious cleavages, expanded their lobbying portfolios to influence devolved policies and 
created new institutional machinery to coordinate cross-border agricultural policy. NI branches 
of UK trade unions, such as UNISON (the public service union) and the National Association of 
Schoolmasters Union of Women Teachers (NASUWT), were given more organisational 
autonomy and resources. Professional associations also strengthened their presence, by creating 
new NI-based positions or setting up new branches, though these remain small, under-resourced 
and have had difficulty in responding to consultations. Voluntary groups have historically had a 
strong local presence and insider status in NI; but those operating UK-wide, such as Help the 
Aged, have needed to step up their policy presence to compete for access to government. 
 
Focus 
The contested nature of NI has always made it difficult to sustain a strong territorial focus among 
groups. Since the Good Friday Agreement, there is a new reference point but also a continuing 
UK and an augmented all-Ireland perspective.  
 
The business sector has always been strongly focussed on Northern Ireland. During the 
Troublesii, business groups such as the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), NI Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry and Institute of Directors developed a wider political role by jointly 
seeking to initiate dialogue between political parties to create peace and stability. Such efforts 
were supported by state, USA and EU organisations, leading to increased resources and a 
stronger voice for the business community. Since the Good Friday Agreement, business groups 
have increased their focus on devolved policy issues but there is evidence of overload due to 
extensive government consultations, demands of assembly committees and requests for advice 
from politicians. Business groups (with the exception of the Federation of Small Businesses) 
have developed a strong insider role, working closely together to build a common framework for 
economic growth. Beyond NI, they have expanded their focus to encompass the ‘Island of 
Ireland’ perspective. The CBI in particular has strengthened cross-border relations with the Irish 
Business and Employers Federation (IBEC) to focus on transport and logistics.  
 
Farm interest groups have long focussed on sectoral and geographical enclaves in NI. 
Representation was divided between the Ulster Farmers Union (UFU), whose membership 
comprised the larger, productivist-oriented farms in the East, and the NI Agricultural Producers’ 
Association (NIAPA), representing smaller, stewardship-oriented farms in the catholic western 
counties. Since 1998, while both have increased their focus on devolved legislation, relations 
between them remain frayed. UFU has diverged on issues such as BSE (mad-cow disease) from 
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its sister organisation in Britain (the National Farmers’ Union) and strengthened its links with 
Republic of Ireland (Irish Farmers Union), European (Committee of Professional Agricultural 
Organisations) and international (International Federation of Agricultural Producers) bodies. 
 
Trade unions are divided into two categories: regional branches of UK unions, which have 
historically looked across the water, and locally based unions that looked towards the Republic 
of Ireland. Although there are differences on some policy matters, such as regional pay versus 
national parity, unions have corroborated on a number of issues since devolution (such as 
opposing the 11+ exam) to pressure the devolved administration. 
 
Professional associations have begun to shift their focus to NI since devolution, but lacking 
resources, they have not adapted as quickly or easily as other groups. The main focus of the 
Royal Colleges and medical profession is on London. Yet, organisations such as the British 
Medical Association (BMA) have become an important part of the health policy community, 
leading the campaigns for a smoking ban (Cairney, 2009). Whilst professional organisations 
continue to draw on best practices in other parts of the UK, they now allow for greater 
divergence in campaigns and strategies.  
  
The NI voluntary sector was highly influential in policy-making prior to devolution, filling the 
policy gap left by political parties (McCall and Williamson 2001; Knox and Carmichael 2005). 
Groups organised under the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action (NICVA) developed 
close relations with civil servants and ministers. After devolution, voluntary groups concentrated 
their efforts on winning the support of NI Assembly politicians (MLAs), and giving evidence to 
assembly committees. Voluntary groups have adapted well to the new institutions, capitalising 
on their pre-devolution access to policy-making channels.  
 
In addition to the creation of a new ‘Celtic periphery’ perspective, and reinvigorated cross-border 
relations with the Republic of Ireland, groups also increased their engagement with European 
associations. Organisations such as the NI Local Government Association, and the NI Federation 
of Housing Associations, have become involved in Europe-wide groups, in an effort to engage in 
policy learning from outside of the UK. 
 
Cognitive frames 
A territorially based collective identity is prohibited by inter-communal conflict in Northern 
Ireland. The creation of two polarised political communities during the Troubles – a Catholic 
nationalist/republican community and a Protestant unionist/loyalist community – led to two 
distinct sets of identities and conflicting narratives of NI (Graham and Nash 2006). There is 
evidence, however, that post-devolution NI has witnessed the development of a shared 
commitment to the broad goal of socio-economic renewal, even if the creation of a unified 
community remains elusive. Interest groups have begun to relinquish the UK versus all-Ireland 
perspectives of political change and articulate NI territorial interests in a post-devolution UK. 
Although there is no equivalent of the ‘be Welsh’ agenda, there is a realisation of specific policy 
problems facing NI and a search for common solutions.  
 
Interaction 
A new regional frame of reference has inspired the creation of social partnerships and policy 
umbrella groups at the devolved level, involving devolved government, non-departmental public 
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bodies (quangos), unions, charities, non-governmental associations and professional associations 
on both sides of the Catholic/Protestant and Irish/UK divides. These partnerships, such as the 
Civic Forum, have provided channels for inter-sectoral and inter-community dialogue.  
 
Since 1998, there has been increased interaction between interest groups, both within and 
between different sectors. Business groups regularly meet with representatives from the public 
sector, voluntary sector, unions and academia under the Economic Development Forum. 
Education unions meet through the Northern Ireland Teaching Council to develop common 
positions on education policy. Professional associations such as the Chartered Society of 
Physiotherapists and the Royal College of Midwives share resources, information and office 
space. Likewise, voluntary homelessness organisations in NI, organised under an umbrella 
grouping, organise events and distribute jointly produced literature. Sharing resources has 
resulted from the weak capacity of NI branches. It is now more difficult for policy actors to ‘opt 
out’ of Northern Irish politics as they were able to do under direct rule. Instead, there has been an 
increasing emphasis on ‘working together’ to foster ‘good relations’ as stipulated in the 
consultation process A Shared Future: Improving Relations in Northern Ireland (OFMDFM 
2003). The common theme of social and economic development provides an important basis for 
cooperation despite the continued polarisation of partisan politics along the unionist/republican 
divide.  
 
Conclusion 
Devolution has strengthened the territorial dimension of interest representation. The most clearly 
visible change is that groups have reorganized themselves as interlocutors with the new 
institutions. This has tended to take the form of a boosted territorial presence, rather than the 
emergence of completely new groups or breakaways from existing UK groups. All, however, 
have been constrained by resources and have to be selective about the fields in which they 
intervene, leading to a clearer demarcation of roles with UK counterparts. There was a lack of 
Euroscepticism among respondents in all cases but in practice a relative inattention to the 
European level, which tends to be left to the UK parent bodies, or to the devolved governments 
and assemblies. While before devolution many groups looked to Europe as a way of by-passing 
an unsympathetic central government, this was of less importance after 1999. There has also 
been a certain disillusion with the Europe of the Regions theme and a realization that the 
opportunities for non-state actors are limited.  
 
The hypothesis that stronger forms of devolution will produce a stronger boundary, so that 
groups will be locked in, is partially confirmed. Groups in Scotland find it more difficult to 
circumvent devolved institutions than those in Wales or NI, and those in NE England find it 
easiest. Business remains mobile and well-resourced and can venue-shop. However, it has 
become part of the territorial policy community despite initial aloofness. Trade unions are more 
committed to devolution in principle, but also strongly attached to UK-wide welfare state 
standards, regulation and wage bargaining. The voluntary sector is most territorialized, has most 
to gain from devolution and is least able to venue-shop. Strong devolution has widened the 
policy agenda in Scotland, Wales and NI, as multiple policy sectors have to compete for 
attention, although policy frames do remain largely sectoral. In NE England, there is little 
widening of the agenda, as the institutions are focused on economic development.  
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Cognitive change is visible. In Scotland, the territorial frame has taken on a deeper political and 
economic meaning since devolution. In Wales, where it was weaker, it has strengthened, while in 
NE England it remains weak. In NI, the territorial frame has always been contested but there is 
evidence that groups are more willing to think in a NI frame where economic and social issues 
are concerned. There are also signs of an emerging all-Ireland frame, no longer seen as 
necessarily incompatible with the UK frame. The strengthening of the territorial frame does not, 
however, mean any weakening of the sectoral or class one so that, pace modernization theory, 
these are not fundamentally in contradiction. Rather, territory refracts sectoral and class 
representation and provides a new context for them. 
 
There is less evidence of interaction among groups around newly-defined or re-defined policy 
issues. Sectors remain distinct and contacts among groups in different sectors occur via 
government and elected assemblies. We do not see an emerging meso-level corporatism or 
negotiated order. Key issues relevant to corporatist bargaining or social partnership, including 
taxation and labour market policy, remain the preserve of central government. 
 
In one respect, devolution has weakened territorial communities in dividing the old territorial 
lobbies and they now compete within the new arenas. Groups have had difficulty in making the 
transition from lobbyists to policy influentials. Early expectations about devolution producing a 
new political consensus gave way to disillusion in the early 2000s, especially with excessive 
consultation. Later, a new realism emerged as groups learned to work the new system and to 
concentrate their efforts where they could be most effective.  
 
We have seen a territorialization of policy communities and new forms of horizontal co-
operation and competition. The new territorial policy communities, however, are open and linked 
at numerous points to wider arenas. Some groups need to operate at several levels, while others 
are confined to one. New boundaries are forming around policy communities, but they are weak. 
The devolved state will not emerge as the equivalent of the old integrated nation-state but we are 
not seeing ‘regions without regionalism’. Rather the devolved territories are being reconstructed 
as loosely bounded spaces. There is an emerging common interest in economic development, 
influenced by new regionalist themes and the theme of inter-territorial competition. The internal 
articulation of the territories as spaces for political exchange and interest intermediation, on the 
other hand, is less developed and is most marked where political devolution is strongest. 
 
We were fortunate in having, in the UK, a laboratory with four devolution models. The 
comparative study of interest articulation and the interaction of territory and function remains a 
neglected area in the literature on spatial rescaling, the new regionalism and devolution (although 
see Keating, Loughlin and Deschouwer, 2003). In particular we know little about how interest 
representation adapts to changed structures of territorial government. This is surprising, given the 
rise of regional or ‘meso’ government across western Europe and, more recently central and 
eastern Europe (Sharpe, 1993; Keating, 1998; Keating and Hughes, 2004). We believe that our 
framework would be of particular value in cases where government is decentralizing, as in Spain, 
Italy or, following the federal reforms in Germany. Our approach also has the potential to link 
this literature with that of public policy making more generally.  
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In this project we have stopped at the stage of interest articulation. The next step will be to 
examine the impact of different forms of interest representation on the policy-making process 
and on policy outcomes.  
 
We acknowledge the support of the Leverhulme Trust programme on Nation and Region, the 
ESRC programme on Devolution and Constitutional Change and the Nuffield Foundation.  
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